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PHD THESIS SUMMARY: 
The many faces of rational choice theory 
 
CATHERINE HERFELD 
PhD in history and philosophy of economics, April 2013 
Witten/Herdecke University 
 
In recent decades the epistemic potential of ‘rational choice theory’ has 
been profoundly questioned. Skepticism towards economic man and his 
‘imperialistic attitude’ has been advocated by behavioral economists, 
psychologists, and philosophers for several decades now. Not only does 
the rejection of rational choice theory appear to follow from our 
common sense. With the breakthrough of behavioral economics, rational 
choice theory has also become challenged on empirical grounds. 
Although these critiques may appear to be prima facie justified, it is 
significant that many appraisals of rational choice theory are conducted 
independently from the actual context in which the theory is applied. 
This often results in an underestimation of the pragmatic usefulness of 
rational choice theory in the context of different scientific practices.   
My dissertation points to the weaknesses inherent in context-
independent appraisal. The overarching goal is to seek a comprehensive 
understanding of ‘rational choice theory’ against the backdrop of actual 
economic practices. This, I believe, will serve as strong basis for more 
nuanced appraisal of the theory.  
In chapter 1, I show that there exists fundamental confusion in the 
philosophical and social scientific literature about what rational choice 
theory is. This originates in the fact that ‘rational choice theory’         
has many faces. These faces are conceptually and methodologically 
distinct in contemporary economics and have been applied to strikingly 
disparate problems. They have, however, never been distinguished from 
one another. Furthermore, many appraisals rest upon the unsupported 
premise that rational choice theory is used as a psychological theory    
of human behavior (see Hausman 1995; Satz and Ferejohn 1994).        
My dissertation offers an account of rational choice theory that is more 
sensitive towards actual practices and runs contrary to this ‘received 
view’. I suggest that the various manifestations of rational choice theory 
could be better understood as a family of theoretical approaches, which 
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can be subsumed under the heading of ‘rational choice analysis’. They 
each constitute an account of human agency that is based upon some 
version of individual rationality, but they differ fundamentally in how 
rationality is interpreted and conceptualized. So far, this diversity of 
rational choice analysis has not been well understood. Yet, failure         
to recognize the existence and nature of these many faces has ensured 
that they are appraised in isolation from the problems for which they 
were designed in the first place to solve. I suggest that such isolation 
can often result in misdirected critique.  
I argue further that developing a framework for appraisal that   
takes the various pragmatic contexts of rational choice explanations 
into account requires tracing the historical emergence of rational choice 
analysis. This is because contemporary rational choice explanations are 
rooted in different intellectual traditions and have emerged from earlier 
attempts to conceptualize the behavior of human agents within specific 
problem-contexts. To capture the variety of different historical 
backgrounds for rational choice explanations, I take an approach that is 
used in historical epistemology, namely ‘case study analysis’. Case study 
analysis suggests itself when what I call the ‘method of local critique’    
is used as a method of appraisal. This is the approach that implicitly 
underlies Philip Kitcher’s work in philosophy of biology (see, e.g., 
Kitcher 2003). In my dissertation, I use both approaches to appraise the 
different faces of rational choice against the backdrop of their history.  
In chapters 2 to 4, I show that the history of rational choice analysis 
reveals a four-fold shift that is related to economists’ changing 
conceptualizations of individual behavior and the problems they 
address. First, the concept of rationality has become considerably 
narrower in comparison with its intellectual precursors, such as the 
theories of practical reason and rational behavior variously developed 
by Aristotle, Daniel Bernoulli, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume.  
Second, following the Marginalist revolution, the focus of economic 
analysis shifted from understanding the sources of wealth and the 
functioning of markets towards extracting the logic of choice that 
underlies individual behavior. This shift is reflected in the changes       
of the methodological status that rational choice approaches occupied, 
away from W. S. Jevons’s crude principles of utility towards Max Weber’s 
ideal types and Ludwig von Mises’s praxeology. It went hand in hand 
with the different justifications for re-conceptualizing human agency, 
namely allowing economists to better address the distinct problems 
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economists were respectively concerned with. Third, from the 1940s 
onwards, rationality became formulated axiomatically, allowing rational 
choice analysis to be employed as a highly flexible ‘toolbox’, applicable, 
with appropriate specifications, to a range of problems beyond the 
traditional scope of economics. The long-standing separation of human 
rationality and human psychology in much economic thought reached 
its apogee in Gérard Debreu’s Theory of value published in 1959. Finally, 
in parallel with the introduction of the axiomatic choice method to 
economics, a fourth shift occurred that constituted an attempt to unify 
the social sciences by addressing social scientific problems beyond the 
traditional realm of the market. This shift is particularly pronounced    
in Gary Becker’s Economic account of human behavior (1976) and the 
tradition of Chicago price theory. These four shifts reveal that none of 
the conceptually distinct manifestations of rational choice analysis was 
ever primarily intended as a psychological theory of human behavior.  
In chapter 5, I outline some implications of these findings with 
respect to the potential and limitations of rational choice analysis, and 
for the often-voiced claim that economics requires a descriptively 
adequate (psychological or even neural) theory of human behavior. 
Given that economists address problems characterized by complexity, 
they can frequently provide only what F. A. von Hayek (1955) called 
‘explanations of the principle’. In those cases, explaining individual 
behavior on the neurological, psychological or behavioral level does not 
necessarily facilitate better comprehension of phenomena occurring     
at the institutional or macro-level.  
Furthermore, I argue that on the three predominant interpretations 
of rationality in economics (i.e., consistency, maximization, self-
interest), rational choice analysis cannot accommodate what I call the 
‘normative dimension of agency’ and what Amartya Sen (1977)           
has termed ‘acting from commitment’. On all three interpretations, 
rationality is understood as ‘instrumental rationality’ in the Humean 
tradition. As such, rational choice analysis finds itself in stark contrast 
with the Kantian tradition and the idea of moral agency as being 
essential and constitutive of rationality. It is the Kantian understanding 
of rationality, however, that characterizes Sen’s concept of commitment. 
The difficulty in accounting for committed behavior—understood in a 
Kantian sense as acting from duty—with a theoretical framework that 
relies upon an instrumental understanding of rational action reveals      
a fundamental weakness of rational choice analysis, but only when it is 
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depicted as a universal theory of human behavior and appraised from a 
realist perspective. By analyzing Cristina Bicchieri’s (2006) account     
for norm-conformity, I conclude that recent attempts by behavioral 
economists to accommodate pro-social behavior within an axiomatic 
choice framework are themselves questionable. 
In a final discussion of the main findings of my thesis, I argue that 
conventional meta-narratives formulated in Lakatosian or Kuhnian 
terms are inadequate either as an interpretation of the conceptual 
history developed in chapters 2 to 4, or as a fruitful assessment           
of rational choice analysis. This is because the interpretation of what is 
meant by ‘rational action’ has drastically changed throughout history,  
as have the problems economists address. This diversity of meaning 
hinders easy comparison of the different faces of rational choice. 
However, what this historical reconstruction reveals is a lasting 
commitment by economists to what I call ‘methodological rationalism’, 
i.e., the doctrine that individual behavior can be conceptualized        
with recourse to some notion of rationality. I conclude with an epilogue 
on the methodology of philosophy of economics, defending case-study 
analysis and the method of local critique as a fruitful alternative to 
traditional methods of appraisal. 
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